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Abstracts

浅古泰史

The Effects of Violence on Political Elections

This paper provides a formal model based on an asymmetric war of attrition to explain how political violence affects voters' minds and outcomes of political competition. In early periods, voters who are uncertain about a probability that a conflict ends support a hawkish party because they believe that the conflict will end soon. However, if violence is used for a long period, voters come to believe that the conflict will continue for a long period and switch their support to a dovish party. Thus, a group may have an incentive to continue to attack until a dovish party wins. Moreover, although a hawkish party knows a probability that a conflict ends is low, the party prefers to fight if it is myopic and less policy motivated.

福元健太郎

A Bayesian View of Party Systems

This paper presents a Bayesian model to infer party system from sequence of actual in-parties, using state space form. The model assumes an unobserved and stochastic variable of party system which defines probabilities of each in-party (measurement equation). It also incorporates how often one party system changes to another (transition equation). After observing actual in-party, this Bayesian model updates prior belief about party system to obtain its posterior belief. The paper also provides a MCMC (Markov Chain Monte Carlo) estimator using Kalman filter and applies it to the American party systems of the executive and both chamber of the legislature in both the federal and 50state governments from Civil War to today. The results of U.S. President formally imply that the sixth party system began in 1968 or, at latest,1980. The analysis also emphasizes uncertainty about party system during the Wilson, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Clinton and Obama administrations.

肥前洋一・安達貴教

Political Accountability, Electoral Control and Media Bias

How does media bias affect politicians' behaviors and voter welfare? To answer this question, we construct a game theoretic model in which an incumbent politician, who is either an ethical type who pursues the public interest or an opportunistic type who pursues his or her own interest, decides on whether to take a dishonest action; then mass media obtain some information about it and report it to voters, possibly with media bias; and finally the voters, who try to elect an ethical politician, vote for the incumbent or the challenger. We show that the direction of media bias, as well as the degree of bias, is important in determining whether voter welfare decreases due to media bias. In particular, when the incumbent is less (more, respectively) likely to be ethical than the challenger, anti-incumbent (pro-incumbent) bias has no influence if mass media do not have pro-incumbent (anti-incumbent) bias.

堀内勇作・佐藤愛

Electoral Redistricting, Incumbency Advantage, and Endogenous Candidate Selection

"One-vote, one-value" is a fundamental principle of democracy, and previous scholars have investigated a wide range of relevant topics. In this paper, we examine the effects of redrawing district boundaries (redistricting) on political parties' candidate selection strategies. This study is distinct from previous studies in two regards. First, we focus on a unique natural experimental setting in Australia, where a non-partisan committee determines redistricting, exogenously to the causal mechanism constituting the process of candidate selection. Second, we develop a formal model of endogenous candidate selection which assumes strategic interactions by a party won a seat in the previous election and a party defeated, and examine how an exogenous shock (i.e., redistricting) affects their decisions. Our empirical result is consistent with the incumbency disadvantage hypothesis, one of the two hypotheses deduced from our model; namely, the magnitude of redistricting significantly increases the probability that the winning party replaces their incumbent legislator with a fresh candidate.

籠谷公司

Signaling, Trade, and Alliance Commitment in Crisis

Successful deterrence occurs when alliance relationships are reliable. However, while allies worry

about treaty abrogation by their partners, they try to avoid getting themselves involved in an unnecessary war. Deterrence works when allies simultaneously solve these strategic interaction problems. I explore when and how intra-alliance trade cooperation enables allies to convey their intentions; not only to each other but also to potential challengers, thus making deterrence work. I present a crisis bargaining model where leaders confront both domestic and international political risks arising from intra-alliance trade cooperation. The equilibrium analysis suggests that trade signaling can promote deterrence and prevent crisis escalation. The logic of trade signaling sheds light on the importance of intra-alliance trade cooperation as a policy instrument to maintain peace and proposes a new microfoundation for the trade-security linkage.

黒阪健吾・肥前洋一・犬飼佳吾

Duverger's Law in the Laboratory

In this paper, we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the robustness of Duverger's law and its extension "M+1 rule." The M+1 rule states that, in an M-member electoral district with the single nontransferable vote, votes are concentrated on M+1 candidates, and Duverger's law is the case of M=1. Our experimental results support the comparative statics of the M+1 rule so that votes are concentrated on a smaller number of candidates under M=1 than under M=2. Whether the M+1 rule itself is supported or not depends on what type of index we use to measure the effective number of candidates. In this sense, the M+1 rule is supported to a certain degree.

斉藤淳

Using Synthetic Control to Analyze the Decline of the LDP's Electoral Performance

By using the synthetic control method, this paper analyzes the change in the LDP's vote-getting capabilities. In particular, the cases of Iwaki and Niigata are examined to probe the effect of municipal mergers and shinkansen. Iwaki's municipal merger in 1966 was an isolated case, and it consolidated several municipalities into a single entity with a population size of about 330,000. Niigata was the only Prefectural seat on the western coastal area that was connected to Tokyo directly through the high-speed railway. Service in 1982. By comparing the change in the LDP's vote share against synthetically created counterfactuals, I will investigate whether these institutional and environmental changes affected the LDP's long-term electoral performance. The results suggest that municipal mergers in 1966 did not result in the LDP's loss of votes but the

Shinkansen line eroded the LDP's electoral performance in Niigata.

ラウンド・テーブル：How to Publish in Leading English Journals

冒頭、次の3人から5分ずつ程度で話題提供をします。まず籠谷公司氏から、*American Political Science Review* 編集部が置かれている UCLA に在籍していた経験から、*APSR* の編集状況についてお話いただきます。また *International Studies Quarterly* のスコア・シートについてもご説明下さる予定です。次に福元健太郎より、*American Journal of Political Science* の編集委員として接した、2010-13年の *AJPS* 編集長になった Rick Willson の編集方針をお伝えします。最後に斉藤淳氏が、*Cambridge University Press* による出版業界や単行本の話についてご紹介なさいます。引き続いて参加者全員で、論文をどのように書くか、各ジャーナルの編集方針や採択状況はどうなっているかなどといったことについて、インフォーマルに情報交換します。

梅田道生

Challenging Strongmen with Zombies: Incumbency Advantage and the Double Candidacy System in Japan

This paper studies the magnitude of incumbency advantage in Japan after the electoral reform to the mixed-member majoritarian electoral system in 1994. Despite the reputation of candidate-centered campaigns in Japan, which suggests a large incumbency advantage, I show with a Regression Discontinuity Design that incumbents lack this advantage. By using a natural quasi-experiment, I demonstrate that the double-candidacy system explains this finding. Counter to the conventional wisdom, the system hurts the incumbents by awarding available PR seats to the most competitive candidates in each party who failed to win at the district level. In the next election, these MPs challenge at the district level with incumbency status from the PR seats, cancelling out the advantage of the district incumbents. I indicate that these PR incumbents have 2-3% of the electoral advantage from their incumbency status, which significantly helps them to compete with the district incumbents.

渡辺安虎・川合慶

Inferring Strategic Voting

We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction [75.3%, 80.3%] of strategic voters, only a small fraction [2.4%, 5.5%] of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred (misaligned voting). Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two, estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. Accordingly, while our estimate of strategic voting is high, our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies.

和田淳一郎

Divisor Apportionment Method and Generalized Entropy Based on Atkinson Social Welfare Function

Using the Atkinson Social Welfare Function, which includes the Rawlsian, Nash, and Benthamian Social Welfare Functions, as a micro foundation, we derive the generalized entropy, which includes the Theil Index, Mean Log Deviation (Kullback-Leibler divergence, relative entropy), and Coefficient of Variance, along with a divisor method for apportionment with the Stolarsky mean, which includes the d'Hondt, Sainte-Lague, and U.S. Lower House method. We then evaluate them from the viewpoint of equity between populations and between their representatives.

茨木瞬

「二大政党化と参議院二人区」

2010年に行われた第22回参院選において、民主党はほとんどの二人区で2人の候補者を擁立した。当時幹事長であった小沢一郎衆院議員が指示した、いわゆる“小沢戦略”のベネフィット及びコストを解明し、その狙いと“小沢戦略”の採択理由を探る。

田中翔一郎

「選挙の効果：実験による分析」

Fukumoto and Horiuchi(2009)による自然実験のデザインを用い、選挙が与える効果を実証分析する。主に財政以外の分野について検定を行い、これまで注目されなかった因果の解明を目指す。

川原司・高木紀明

「参院選データベース構築と基礎的データ分析」

はじめに昨年に引き続き、参院選市区町村別データの収集・入力・整理状況について報告する。つづいて入力されたデータを用いて行った分析結果について報告する。具体的には、衆院選の集計データ分析を行った水崎・森の一連の研究や川人の分析を参考にした分析を行い、衆参の相違を比較・検討する。