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and Formal Theory of Political Science

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Abstracts

◎ 1月4日（金）（プレ集会）

瀧田大（筑波大学）
岸本一男（筑波大学）

Roles of migration rates in political party approval ratings in national elections in Japan

This paper gives a conspectus of population migrations among prefectures and that among municipalities in Japan. Political party approval ratings in national elections as well as other various factors are regressed on them. The results suggests that population migration is one of the key factors in national elections in Japan.

辻陽（近畿大学）

"Keiretsu" Also Works Well at the Elections to the House of Councillors?

I'd like to discuss the function of "keiretsu" in the elections to the House of Councillors. "Keiretsu" is known as the links between national representatives and local politicians for mutual electoral support. Then, can we expect similar support for the candidates of the House of Councillors from local LDP politicians? To answer this question, I choose the prefectures which are allotted to cast single member of the House of Councillors at one election and examine the next hypotheses. (1) The larger the number of LDP members in the prefectural assembly is, the more evenly the LDP candidate receives votes from each municipality in its prefecture. (2) The more percentage LDP members

occupy the seats of the prefectural assembly, the more evenly the LDP candidate receives votes from each municipality in its prefecture.

堤英敬 (香川大学)

A Reassessment of the Party Organization Structure in Japan: The Role of Party in the Upper House Election

It has been considered that Japan's political parties, especially the LDP under the 1955 system, developed decentralized organizational structure and it related to the Lower House electoral system, SNTV. In Upper House election, different from the Lower House election, about 20-25% of members were elected from single-member district, and it was not rare that parties endorse only one candidate in multi-member district. And its district size was larger than the Lower House's. These institutional characteristics might increase importance of party vote for voters and candidates. If it was the case, votes which candidates received were influenced by national level factors like issues than district and/or candidate level factors. It also expected that ability to garner votes depend on not only candidate themselves but also party on the ground. Through an analysis of the component of votes, this presentation attempt to reassess the party organization in Japan.

名取良太 (関西大学)

The Duration of the LDP Regime and the Upper House Election

Under the Japanese political institution, it is very important to win the majority seats in the Upper House as well as the Lower House in order that the ruling party continues to manage the political competition stably. In other words, they cannot maintain stable power without winning the majority seats in the Upper House. However, the existing arguments concerning the LDP regime only focus on successes of the Lower House election (e.g. Koenkai, political factions, pork barrel), not a logical clarification of their successes of the Upper House election. This presentation aims to reconsider the LDP regime, through the analysis of the LDP's success and failure in the Upper House election, using the municipal level data.

福元健太郎 (学習院大学)

Vote by Name: Familiar Family Names Help Candidates

This study argues that citizens cast a ballot for a candidate just because they know his or her family name. In Japan, this mechanism is important. First, Japanese call family names first (e.g. "Ono Yoko" instead of "Yoko Ono"). Second, in the campaign, shouting candidate's family name is the major tactics. The electoral system of the House of Councilors from 1947 to 1980 has the two tiers, the national and prefectural districts. I calculate "standardized vote share" by dividing the vote share of a national district candidate in each municipality by his or her vote share in the nation. I regress standardized vote shares on the dummy variable whether he or she finds any candidate in the prefecture district who shares the same family name with him or her. When I analyze data of 1980, I find the coefficient is thirty percent and significant.

堀内勇作(Dartmouth College)

Lower House Seat Advantage in Upper House Elections in Japan

Is there an advantage of having an incumbent lower house member in mobilizing votes for the incumbent's party during an upper house election? In this paper, we examine this question using the detailed municipality-level upper house and lower house election data from Japan. The expected contributions of this project are twofold. First, we aim to contribute to the broad literature on incumbency advantage. Despite the fact that every country has various types (e.g., executive vs. legislative, upper house vs. lower house, etc.) and levels (e.g., national, prefectural, municipal, etc.) of elections, the impacts of having an incumbent on the outcomes of elections, in which the incumbent helps other candidates from the same party in mobilizing votes is under investigated. Second, more specifically, we aim to improve our understanding of the nature of electoral competition in Japan after the electoral reform in 1994. Methodologically, we apply two natural experimental methods: regression discontinuity and geographical discontinuity designs.

長谷川憲人 (関西大学)

山田凱 (関西大学)

Designing the database for comparative political research

There is a terrible situation that although he (she) is a researcher of Japanese politics, he spends too much time on collecting and arranging of the data, rather than analyzing because vast amounts of Japanese electoral data was not digitized.

Hence, we design of relational database for comparative political research which digitalized the data from paper media such as the results of upper house election, the prefectural assembly election, and gubernatorial election to deal with the above problem. We upload it on the web server for making a condition that anyone, not only researchers can access as our final objective.

One of the parts that we most concentrated is design of the system whereby users can customize and combine each data of their choices and download it with only clicking based on our concept "design of user-friendly database." At the presentation, we are considering demonstration to establish that the users can go through the process with only clicking or not.

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浅古泰史 (早稻田大学) (with Tetsuya Matsubayashi and Michiko Ueda)

Seniority, Term Limits, and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the United States

What are the fiscal consequences of legislative term limits? To answer this question, we first study how the average seniority of a legislature affects government spending. We develop a legislative bargaining model that predicts a U-shaped relationship between average seniority and spending: the amount of government spending decreases as the average seniority of the legislature increases from low to moderate, while it increases as the average seniority increases from moderate to high. Our model also predicts that the equilibrium level of seniority is moderate. Building on these predictions, we hypothesize that the adoption of term limits resulting in a small reduction in average seniority in the legislature has little impact on government expenditures because average seniority remains moderate. In contrast, the adoption of term limits that dramatically reduces average seniority of the legislature will increase the amount of government spending because average seniority changes from moderate to low. We test the predicted relationship between seniority, term limits, and government spending using panel data for US state legislatures between 1980 and 2004.

福元健太郎 (学習院大学)

What Happens Depends on When It Happens: Copula-based Ordered Event History Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome

Political scientists are interested in not just when an event happens but also what kind of event happens. Moreover, what happens is related to when it happens. The present paper takes advantage of copula to model dependence between latent time and event variables, which is impossible for usual event history analysis such as competing risks model. A merit of copula is that, whatever marginal distributions time and event variables follow, scholars can take into account dependence between the two. Monte Carlo simulation illustrates that separate estimation of time and event makes the

estimate of event model biased when dependence between time and event is substantially large. This paper applies the method to the data of civil war duration and outcome (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009) and finds that strong rebel lengthen civil war duration but does not affect its outcome, which the original authors predict but fail to find.

堀内勇作(Dartmouth College)

Public Expenditures in Election Year: A Natural Experiment in Indonesia

Do the size and composition of government expenditures change during election years? Scholars have examined this question for nearly four decades, but the recent "credible revolution" (Angrist and Pischke 2010) in empirical economics, which focuses on the importance of research designs and identification strategies, calls in question about the validity of existing studies. In this study, we revisit this classic question in the literature of political business cycle by focusing on a natural experimental setup in Indonesia. In the course of democratization, Indonesia introduced mayoral elections in 2005-2009. Importantly, the first wave of elections in 2005 was held in about half of the municipalities across the nation. Due to some historical reasons, this staggered nature of first mayoral elections approximates to an as-if random assignment. We first demonstrate that pre-treatment variables are indeed well balanced. Then, we show that the election timing has no systematic effect on the size and composition of government expenditures. We discuss some potential sources of this result, which is inconsistent with the findings in most previous studies, and suggest the relevance of political contexts to understand the politics of budget making.

石原章史 (京都大学)

Concessions and Repression: Can Democratizing Lead to Civil War?

We build a model for predicting civil wars where the government bargains with an opposition group through repression and transfers to the group. The equilibrium is either a state of perpetual peace where there are only concessions and no repression, or the equilibrium leads to civil wars, where the concessions are lower and repression higher as compared to the peace equilibrium. An initial movement towards democracy

for an autocracy leads to more conflict. After a threshold level of democracy, we achieve a state of peace where there are only concessions and no repression. This provides one explanation for the inverted-U shape between probability of war and democracy found in empirical studies. We test the predictions of our model through cross-country panel data using country and year-fixed effects and find evidence consistent with the model.

粕谷祐子 (慶應義塾大学)

Democracy and Transparency: Enacting the Freedom of Information Acts around the World

Why and how does democracy lead to transparency? I study this question by focusing on the enactment timing and the strength of the freedom of information acts (FOIAs) around the world. I argue that the external (i.e. outside of the government) pressure for transparency reform play an important role, while the government turnover and the vulnerability of the chief executive mitigate the effect of external pressure. This claim makes contrast with the existing majority arguments that the elite-level competition determines the FOIA politics. I test my claim by employing cross-national statistical analyses as well as the case study that compares the policy-making processes of FOIAs in the UK and Germany. Both types of analyses render support for my argument.

菊池啓一 (筑波大学・University of Pittsburgh)

Senatorial Behavior and the Legislative Process under Federalism: The Case of Argentina

Under what conditions can subnational governments be national veto players? Many studies on federal countries have regarded governors as national veto players even though they do not have such a constitutional status. However, the statistical tests of the existing literature have not succeeded in showing gubernatorial effects on a national political arena. In this paper, I analyze the treatment of presidential bills between 1983 and 2007 in the Argentine Senate, which serves as an arena for subnational governments to influence national politics through their senators. Developing a theory on the subnational electoral connection, in which national

legislators' behavior intends to attract political actors at the subnational level for their career advancement, as well as modeling the sequential flow of the legislative process, I show that only governors with tenure stability can be national veto players by making their senators shelve unwelcome presidential initiatives in committees.

森浩太(Yale University)

The Analysis of Japanese Newspaper Markets

The Japanese newspaper market is studied. Applying the text analysis methods to the editorials of the national and local newspapers, their relative ideological positions and attitudes are quantitatively estimated. These estimates are then used in the analysis of the country's newspaper market structure. In particular, it is investigated how the circulation of each paper is associated with the match between the position of the paper and the demographics and political characteristics of the local market. Also, the strategic choice of the ideological position by newspapers is discussed theoretically and empirically.

◎ 1月6日 (日)

森田果 (東北大学)

Measuring the Effect of Consumer Regulation Change: A Case of University Enrollment Fee in Japan

In the decision of Nov 17, 2006, the Supreme Court of Japan decided that the 'enroll fee' arrangement of a university was illegal penalty clause and unconscionable. It said that a university may not levy nonrefundable tuition fee from applicants. Although the decision's purpose was to protect consumers (applicants), there has been no empirical evaluation whether the purpose has been realized or not after the decision. This paper constructs a panel data set of university enrollment fee of Japanese universities and tries to analyze the causal effect of the decision with respect to the behaviors of universities. Identifying a causal effect of a legal change in a single jurisdiction is often a difficult task since there does not exist sufficient variation. However, this paper employs the difference between private universities, which are affected by the decision, and national universities, which are not, thereby identifying the causal effect.

高木悠貴(Harvard University/Stanford University)

Weighted Voting and Information Acquisition in Committees

In weighted voting systems, the criteria for vote assignment, such as financial contributions at the IMF, are typically unrelated to the voters' ability to make a correct judgment. Do these rules undermine the accuracy of group decisions? This paper analyzes how the vote distribution affects the accuracy of group decisions. I introduce an information aggregation model in which voters are identical except for voting shares. If the information is free, the accuracy of group decisions is always higher under unweighted majority rule than any weighted majority rules. When information is costly, by contrast, I show that the accuracy of group decisions may be higher under some weighted majority rules than under unweighted majority rule. More generally, I characterize the equilibrium in which weighted voters invest in information and unweighted voters do not. The number of voters who invest in equilibrium is decreasing

in the cost of improving their information.

多湖淳 (神戸大学大学院)

池田真季 (東京大学大学院)

International Organizations' Approval of American Use of Force and Foreign Domestic Support: A Survey Experiment

Formal approval by international organizations (IOs) transmits information to foreign domestic audiences that a military action has been conducted with good intentions and for desirable consequences. Scholars thus claim that this information transmission mechanism increases foreign support for the use of force that has the approval of IOs. Although a variety of macro-level evidence exists to support the argument, we use an experimental research design to show that the most critical test has not yet been done at the micro-level. To examine the causal mechanisms that generate foreign public support for IO-approved military actions, the authors conducted a survey experiment with approximately 2,000 Japanese citizens and identified why and when they changed their support for military actions begun by the United States. Evidence revealed that their support increased because they believed that the approval of IOs ensures that the military actions have legal legitimacy.