

**A HIERARCHY OF CITIZENSHIP: IDENTITY POLITICS
OF SUFFRAGE EXTENSION AND WELFARE DEVELOPMENT**

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ABSTRACT

Civil society is widely believed to be composed of a hierarchy of citizenship, not equal citizens. This hierarchy has three dimensions: those of class, family, and nation, though all three are unified as indications of economic and political independence. Furthermore, it is assumed that, in every respect, the majority is economically and politically independent and that minority groups are dependent. As a result, members of the independent majority enjoy suffrage earlier than they do welfare benefits, while the opposite is true for members of the dependent minority. This theory is confirmed in a case study of Japan.

INTRODUCTION

I am undecided as to the question of whether or not human beings are equal. I am certain, however, that human societies and states treat them unequally. The particular concern of this paper is, indeed, this: civil societies do not give all citizens equal political and social rights. We must ask ourselves why some get suffrage, but others do not? Why some enjoy welfare benefits, but others do not? Clearly, the answer will be that there is a hierarchy of citizenship. But why is this the case? What is the rationale behind this power structure?

It is true that suffrage in all democracies and welfare in some countries are now said to be universalized. But is this true? Some individuals still lack political and social rights: the young, aliens, transients, and so on. They are not just the exceptions to universalization. They are instead the residuals of development. The reasons why they are disfranchised, or do not fall within the reach of the welfare state, are not so different from those that explain why females, the poor, and ethnic minorities have been disfranchised in the past. It is a matter of degree, not kind. A hierarchy of citizenship is not just a legacy from the past, but rather a living part of our contemporary power structure.

This paper argues that human beings are categorized according to three identity dimensions: namely, class, family, and nation. It is assumed that the majority are economically and politically independent and that minority groups are dependent. It is further assumed that the independent majority is enfranchised and that dependent minorities are protected by the welfare state. This general theory is elaborated in the next section. Following that exposition, a hypothesis is derived and, subsequently, a case study of Japan is presented to test it. The final section is made up of a summary and a conclusion.

CHAPTER 1

SUFFRAGE, WELFARE, AND INDEPENDENCE

Which rights do people get first, suffrage or welfare benefits? In his classic work, Marshall argues that citizenship is composed of three elements: a civic element, a political element, and a social element. And that the rights of citizenship evolve sequentially: first civil, then political, finally social. Each step is a prerequisite for the next set of rights (Marshall 1950). Rokkan also claims that redistribution follows mass participation (Rokkan et al. 1999, 131-3). As long as one observes only the core citizens, this is true. Once one observes other groups, however, the landscape changes.

Flora and Heidenheimer, on the other hand, insist that “[w]hereas the right to vote was extended from the top to the bottom of the social ladder, social insurance usually was broadened in the other direction” (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981, 27). Soysal maintains as well that “in the case of guest workers, the acquisition of membership rights reverses the Marshallian sequence ... economic and social rights were the first ones to be fully granted to migrant workers in European host countries. Political rights became part of the agenda much later” (Soysal 1994, 131).

But why is this the case? And by the phrase “the social ladder,” Flora and Heidenheimer appear to mean only class. What about questions of gender, age, nationality, and ethnicity? It is true that Soysal mentions aliens, but his argument could be located in a more general framework.

Power resource mobilization theory argues that “the electoral participation of the working class” or “a defense against working-class mobilization” prompted the introduction of social insurance (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981, 58). But why did other classes not demand social insurance before the workers did? Are welfare benefits what everyone really wants?

This paper supposes that an engine to extend the franchise and an engine to develop welfare are different entities. On one hand, the state gives suffrage to those who have economic and political independence, because they are deemed politically competent to make appropriate judgments. On the other hand, the state provides welfare for those who are economically and politically dependent, because they are thought to need the state's paternalistic protection. This is the main argument.

Of course, the criteria used to judge whether a person is independent or dependent vary across countries and over historical periods. Recently, the minimum independence level for enfranchisement has been lowered dramatically, and the maximum limit of independence for welfare recipients has been raised. Synchronically, the speeds of suffrage extension and welfare development are different. But if one focuses on one country at a given time, the more independent persons in it tend to receive suffrage, while those who are more dependent are likely to receive welfare benefits.

Suffrage

Traditionally, the reasons for which the state has granted people political rights have been the following: political competence, intellectual independence, judgment, the *principe capacitaire* (the capability principle, that is, restrictions by literacy, formal education, or appointment to public office), and so on. Taken together, these criteria can be summarized as comprising economic and political independence. It was assumed that only politically independent persons were capable of making political and policy judgments. Hence, economic independence was deemed necessary for political independence. "Citizenship at first excludes all socially and economically dependent persons" (Bendix 1964 [1996], 113-4, 90). Among political rights, I focus exclusively on the right to vote in this paper.

Bendix also argues that “the franchise was accorded not only to those who own land or have interest in business but also to those who acquire a direct interest in the maintenance of the polity through their investments in professional skills and their appointment to positions of public trust,” because only they “can form rational judgments of policies.” According to a Norwegian authority, “Suffrage ... should be reserved to the citizens who have *judgment* enough to understand who would prove the best representatives, and *independence* enough to stick to their conviction in this matter.” In the *ancien régime*, “only the economically independent heads of households” had the right to vote. This they derived “not from their membership in any national community but from their ownership of territory and capital or from their status within legally defined functional corporations such as the nobility, the church, or the guilds of merchants or artisans. There was no representation of individuals: the members of assemblies represented recognized stakes in the system, whether in the form of property holdings or in the form of professional privileges” (Bendix 1964 [1996], 113-4, 117, emphasis original).

Welfare

By contrast, welfare recipients are dependent on the state. The state accorded welfare benefits not because recipients had social rights, but because the state itself recognized, out of paternalistic concerns, the necessity to solve the “social problem.”

Initially, there was a “poor law” period from the 16th to the 19th centuries (Rimlinger 1971). Self-help was its guiding principle. The poor law aimed at helping the destitute or the disabled, namely the most dependent people. It often required a means test and deprived recipients of property control, thus stigmatizing them. In most countries, public relief occupied the main part of social expenditure until the mid-20th century.

Following this, in the 19th century, “the break with liberalism” brought some public social insurances. Insurance groups were formed along the lines of occupational categories. Among social insurances, this paper discusses only the contributory public insurances of health and pension. As for sickness insurance, industrial workers and a few categories of employees below a certain income limit were the first to be insured. Next came agricultural workers and higher-paid employees. Then, benefits were extended to family members and pensioners as well. Self-employed persons were the last group to be included.

Pensions were also extended in similar ways. The first ones were the pensions of workers and certain groups of employees. Later, survivors’ benefits were included. Finally, self-employed persons were insured as well (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981, 53).

It is true that there are “three worlds of welfare capitalism” after development (Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen 1999), but in welfare development, the common trajectory is from the most dependent workers to the most independent, self-employed persons. Even democratic social welfare states covered their nations in the order of dependence. The self-employed hate to be incorporated into a compulsory public social insurance, because they feel that it deprives them of their independence.

Contrast

From the above, it can safely be said that suffrage is extended to independent persons and welfare benefits to dependent ones. Then, those who are accorded social rights should be less likely to win political rights, and vice versa. “[T]he first Factory Acts seek to protect women and children, who at the same time are not considered citizens ... all adult males are citizens because they have the power to engage in the economic struggle and take care of themselves. *Accordingly*, they are excluded from any legitimate claim to protection” (Bendix 1964 [1996], 94, the emphasis is mine).

Clear evidence of this is the disfranchisement of welfare clients, or public *dependents*. In the German National Assembly of 1848-49, for example, “[t]here was general agreement that subjects who received public assistance or were in bankruptcy were not independent and should be excluded from the franchise” (Bendix 1964 [1996], 118). “Pauper exclusions,” argues Keyssar, in the case of state-level politics in the United States, “were generally new constitutional provisions, often adopted at the same conventions that abolished property or taxpaying requirements.” (This was also the case in Japan in 1925 [Soma 1986, 76].) It was said that “[p]aupers were legally dependent on those who ran poorhouses and administered relief ... they lacked ‘self-ownership,’ which limited their capacity to act or vote independently” (Keyssar 2000, 61-2).

To put it another way, social rights do not necessarily accompany political rights. “The extension of social rights with its emphasis upon obligation ... broadens the duties and benefits of the people without necessarily encouraging their social mobilization, whereas the extension of the franchise unequivocally destroys privilege and enlarges the active participation of the people” (Bendix 1964 [1996], 107).

CHAPTER 2

IDENTITIES AND INDEPENDENCE

Political and/or social rights are given not by assessing every individual's independence, but by judging whether or not the category each person belongs to is regarded as independent or dependent. For that reason, the identities that are assigned to people should be scrutinized.

The categorizing of human beings is not done randomly. This paper considers three dimensions of categorization: class, family, and nation. Most scholars consider these identities separately, but I myself do not want to “privilege” any dimension of identity. In each dimension, people are divided into a majority and minority categories (not numerically, but politically). The majority is the core group of citizens, and their “citizenshipness” is higher. Minorities are located at a marginal periphery in the civil society. Hence, there is a hierarchy of citizenship.

In the following, I explain which categories represent the majority group and the minority groups in these dimensions and show that the majority group is economically and politically independent, while minority groups are not.

Class

Classes are divided into landlords and bourgeoisie (upper), the self-employed (including farmers) (middle), and workers (lower). Their order in civil society is the same as it would be in the capitalist market. The upper class is the majority, and workers are the minority.

Landlords have property, that is, economic independence, so that they are thought to be politically independent as well. “Property requirement had long been justified on two grounds. The first was that men who possessed property (especially ‘real property,’ i.e., land

and buildings) had a unique ‘stake in society’ ... especially taxation. The second was that property owners alone possessed sufficient independence to warrant their having a voice in governance” (Keyssar 2000, 5).

Conversely, workers do not have very much money and are thought to lack not only good judgment, but also to follow their employer’s opinion. Because they fall between the two categories, self-employed persons are not rich enough to affect polity, but they are also not poor enough to be dependent on others economically or politically.

The usual indications of independence for purposes of suffrage were tax payment and residence, but not all taxes were counted. First, property tax was necessary, because it was important in determining the size of a person’s assets. Next came income tax and that became another consideration. Then, the poll tax appeared. In some countries, property or income itself, and not taxes based on them, were assessed. Finally, universal suffrage abolished the tax requirement.

Next, residence requirements seem to have nothing to do with class bias, although, in fact, they do. The official reasons for a residency requirement are that close ties to a neighborhood are necessary to make proper judgments at the polls. Time is required for the government to prepare the administrative logistics of elections, and fraud must be prevented. “Particularly in the absence of property or taxpaying qualifications, it seemed sensible to restrict the franchise to those who were familiar with local conditions and likely to have a stake in the outcome of elections” (Keyssar 2000, 63). The residency requirement is, however, a disguised measure designed to disenfranchise workers who do not have property and who frequently move (Piven and Cloward 2000). Fraud prevention is the usual excuse for any restriction placed on the right to vote (Keyssar 2000).

Family

Political rights and social rights are delivered along class lines up to the very door of the house. Inside the house, these rights are allocated according to the gender and age of family members, and patriarchy dominates. Hence, there are four categories: first, male bread winners as heads of family (the majority category), then children, the elderly, and women (all minorities).

A male family head earns money; he represents the family's interests at the polls, and receives welfare benefits on behalf of other family members. "[T]he unit of society was not the individual but the family. A man voted not for himself alone but for all the members of his family ... The head of each family was its sole link to the outside world and its spokesman in the state" (Kraditor 1965 [1981], 24-5).

Since children cannot make their own living, their parents take care of them. If fathers and mothers cannot afford to protect them, the state takes care of them instead. This economic dependence prevents them from making political judgments independently, especially independently of their father and mother. A minimum age is the most common qualification for suffrage today. "[O]nly mature people can make reasoned choices and... in view of the practical difficulties involved in measuring personal maturity, it is safer to rely on age." On the other hand, married persons are sometimes enfranchised at a younger age than those who are unmarried, because marriage is a substitute for age in terms of independence (Blais, Massicotte, and Yoshinaka 2001, 43, 51).

Women were also regarded as an object of protection, and not a subject of participation. Women "were excluded from the polity *for the same reason* that the poor and property-less were disfranchised in the late 18th century: they purportedly lacked the '*independence*' necessary for participation in electoral politics. Economically dependent on men ... women ... could be controlled by men and thus could not be responsible political

actors” (Keyssar 2000, 174, the emphasis is mine). As a result of this dependence, anti-suffrage arguments “identified femininity with inherent emotionalism and illogicality, traits inconsistent with the proper exercise of the suffrage” (Kraditor 1965 [1981], 18). Women were regarded as dependent persons. On the other hand, in the U.S. Progressive Era, the justices of the Supreme Court “treat[ed] women workers as a special class deserving public protection.” And, when protective regulations for women workers were enacted, “analogies between ‘*dependent*’ child and women laborers” were repeatedly referred to (Skocpol 1992, 371, 382).

The elderly, once they quit a job without sufficient assets, badly need help. They are dependent on their family, on charity, on poor relief, and on pensions (Esping-Andersen 1990, 90-1). In addition to this, they are sometimes mentally disabled or they are invalids. Mentally deficient people are disfranchised in all but four countries. “[L]ack of capacity and the impracticability of allowing patients in mental hospitals to vote are used to justify disfranchisement” (Blais, Massicotte, and Yoshinaka 2001, 51).

Nation

Sovereign states take it for granted that “voting rights are ... the [rights] most strictly linked to citizenship: *ipso iure* [sic] non-citizens are excluded from the franchise in most countries” (Rath 1990, 127). “Citizenship entails a territorial relationship between the individual and the state” (Soysal 1994, 140-1). Here, a nation state system is dominant. Persons are allowed a voice in the affairs of the community to which they belong. Why are aliens disfranchised? The usual answer is that aliens are not members of the polity; they have suffrage in their home country, because suffrage is the proper right of citizens, etc.

These reasons, however, seem to be tautological. Why should this be the case? Most aliens are immigrants, or the descendants of immigrants. It is thought that the government

doubts their patriotism and, perhaps, suspects that they are loyal to, or *dependent* on, their home country. Opponents of alien suffrage in the United States in the 19th century insisted that it was “dangerous to confer suffrage upon those who owe[d] their allegiance to foreign powers” (Keyssar 2000, 137).

It is also sometimes argued that immigrants are not familiar with the political issues of the constituency and have no interest in politics. A short period of residence is also a source of insufficient independence for aliens. “Recently arrived immigrants may be presumed to be less familiar with the issues and more vulnerable to manipulation” (Blais, Massicotte, and Yoshinaka 2001, 52). In some states in the United States, naturalized citizens were required to wait for long periods of time before being enfranchised because, allegedly, they needed to “become fully acquainted with American norms and values” (Keyssar 2000, 66).

By contrast, “citizenship is not a significant factor determining eligibility for social services.” Even “in terms of economic rights, credentials and the appropriate legal status count more than formal citizenship status,” except in the case of civil service employment (Soysal 1994, 122-7).

Modern sovereign states are often nation states as well. Hence, even among legal citizens inside a *state*, there are ethnic, or racial, minorities outside the *nation's* majority and these too are sometimes disfranchised. What is the rationale for this behavior?

Minority citizens may be descendants of immigrants or those whose home country is combined with some other country due to occupation (e.g., Koreans in prewar Japan), new state building (e.g., Palestinians in Israel), or secession (e.g., Germans in Czechoslovakia). In this case, the same reasons as those applied to alien disfranchisement are employed.

Indigenous peoples comprise minority groups, too. They have often been said to lack political competence. Native Americans in the United States were disfranchised because they

were not thought to be “civilized,” and also because “Indian tribes were ‘domestic, *dependent* nations,’ ... individual Indians, living with their tribes, were aliens, even if born in the United States.” They “were not born under the jurisdiction of the United States and thus were not covered by the [Fifteenth] amendment” (Keyssar 2000, 60, 165, the emphasis is mine). In Japan, too, indigenous citizens living in the northern and southern peripheries, the Ainus and the Okinawans, were not thought to be “civilized.” The country acted later to enfranchise them than it did others, though “protective laws” had previously been enacted (Oguma 1998).

African-Americans in the United States were disfranchised, because they “were believed to be inferior and lacking in potential republican values” (Keyssar 2000, 55).

On the other hand, if aliens or ethnic minorities succeed in removing these concerns, they may be enfranchised. For example, in some countries, because aliens from former colonies have a special interest in the former suzerain state, they receive suffrage (e.g., citizens of Commonwealth countries in the United Kingdom, Brazilians in Portugal, Moluccans in the Netherlands) (Blais, Massicotte, and Yoshinaka 2001, 52-4; Rath 1990).

Unifying Three Dimensions

All three dimensions (class, family, and nation) are indicators of independence; thus, a minority group in one dimension may be a minority group in another dimension at the same time. This is especially true of ethnic minorities, which are often members of the working class. Take, for example, the fact that most African-Americans in the United States are poor. Actually, “the exclusion of black voters also had significant class dimensions” (Keyssar 2000, 114). Literacy tests and the poll tax were meant to disfranchise them, while the two also worked to expel poor whites from the electorate. In addition, “most immigrants are semi-skilled or unskilled workers, or else unemployed” (Rath 1990, 146). An example of this is to be found in the Korean citizens in prewar Japan, who were disfranchised from 1910 to

1920, not simply because they were not Japanese; they were also disfranchised because they were too poor to make “appropriate” political judgments.

There is also an association between aliens and the poor. American anti-suffragists contended that aliens embraced “images of ignorant, foreign-born paupers ill-equipped to participate in democratic politics” (Keyssar 2000, 137). The opposite was also true; the lower classes in 19th-century Germany “constituted something like an internal ‘foreign’ nation,” so that their movement was restricted (Torpey 2000).

When suffrage extends to a minority group in one dimension, only the majority among them in another dimension may be enfranchised. In the early 1920’s, among women, only mothers and widows of fallen soldiers in Belgium and the upper stratum of women in the United Kingdom were enfranchised (Rokkan 1970, 76). And, if aliens want to be naturalized, they must meet more conditions than native citizens do; property, loyalty to the current constitution, long residency, and good character are a few of these (Rham 1990).

Finally, in every dimension, the source of political independence is tied to property, especially land ownership. As for class, requirements of property, taxation, and residence are all expressions of the connection between suffrage and property. The family is the unit of property ownership. A family head, as husband or father, owns household property on behalf of the women and children. In the dimension of nation, aliens are believed to lack familiarity with their neighbors. Sometimes they are prohibited from owning property. Thus far, we have seen that varieties of categories were disfranchised for different, or ad hoc, reasons. For example, Katz groups qualifications for voting “under three major headings; those based on community membership and having a personal stake in the outcome, those based on competence, and those based on autonomy” (Katz 1997, 216). But these conditions should all be understood as different indicators of ties to property (economic independence) and political independence. All of the causes of disfranchisement can be unified.

Inequality in recognition of independence has been eliminated in the order of class, family, and nation; universal male suffrage was introduced before women's enfranchisement, and, in most cases, aliens have not yet been given the right to vote.

Hypothesis

My main aim is to demonstrate that there is a hierarchy of citizenship. This cannot, however, be observed directly. Instead, in this study, I attempt to show it by revealing who gets suffrage and who gets welfare benefits. But these demarcations are subject to change. Thus, we should look at their dynamics, i.e., suffrage extension and welfare development. Suffrage is given to people in the order of their economic and political independence. By contrast, welfare benefits are given in the order of a person's economic or political dependence. These are predictions derived from my argument. The following is a hypothesis meant to test the above theory.

Hypothesis: *In every country, in each dimension of identity, the majority is accorded suffrage earlier than welfare benefits, while minorities receive welfare benefits earlier than suffrage.*

The unit of analysis is category by country. This paper considers Japanese cases only. The lengths of time required to introduce political and social rights in each case are compared. I do not argue about how early or late suffrage and welfare extensions were made in each country. My interest is only in the relationship between the two rights and in how an individual's independence in every category is perceived, not in what makes nation states democracies or welfare states.

CHAPTER 3

A CASE STUDY: JAPAN

Class

First, I describe contrasting ways of suffrage extension and welfare development in modern Japan in terms of class. The Japanese Imperial Parliament was established in 1889. At the same time, the Electoral Law of the House of Representatives enfranchised: 1) those who had paid more than ¥15 in direct national taxes for more than one year (property taxes), or more than ¥15 in income tax for more than three years; and 2) those who had lived in the constituency for more than one year and were not bankrupt. The right to vote was so limited at that time that electors consisted of only 1 percent of the total population. (Soma 1986, 15).

In 1900, the tax requirement was lowered to those who had paid ¥10 for more than one year (in property taxes) or ¥10 for more than two years (in income tax). As a result, 2.2 percent of Japanese society was then enfranchised. In 1918, ¥3 in taxes for one year was deemed sufficient for suffrage, and the residency requirement was reduced to a term of six months. As a result of the changes, 5 percent of the people then had the right to vote. Finally, in 1925, when Prime Minister, Reijiro Wakatsuki, declared that “the people have a high enough *political competence* to participate in national politics” universal suffrage was enacted (Soma 1986, 20, 22, 78, the emphasis is mine). “Universal suffrage” in this case, however, did not encompass women.

As for welfare benefits, on the other hand, an ordinance for public relief was promulgated in 1874. This helped very poor people living alone who could not work because of senility, disease, or disability. At that time, such individuals were considered to be the most dependent persons in the country, but they were also required to be on the registry of their original residence to receive assistance. In 1932, the Poor Law was enacted. If a guardian deserted a physically or mentally disabled person or persons, the latter would then become

the objects of this law. In 1946, the (Old) Public Relief Law replaced the Poor Law. It was directed as well at those poor people who were still able to work. In 1950, the current (New) Public Relief Law came into effect.

Public health insurance provisions and/or pensions were divided into those for employees and those for non-employees. Health insurance for employees was established in 1922. Blue-collar workers in private company offices regulated by the Mine or the Factory Acts (if there were more than 10 per office) received compulsory insurance. (The law distinguishes office or factory, branch, i.e., *jigyosho* from company or firm, i.e. *kaisha*. The former is a part of the latter.) Health insurance associations were the providers for company offices employing more than 300 workers (optional), and failing this, the government was the provider. Civil servants were insured by a mutual benefit association.

In 1938, health insurance for non-employees, i.e., National Health Insurance, was enacted. This was mainly for farmers, but it also covered employees in small firms that had fewer than five employees per office. In principle, the insurer was to be a municipality-level association. Hence, to receive it, people were required to prove residence in the municipality to which the insurance provider belonged. Originally, this insurance was not mandatory, but it became mandatory in 1958. At that time, all municipalities were required to insure people who were not covered by some other form of employee health insurance. As a result, a universal health insurance system was in place by 1961.

Employee pensions were established in 1941. The definition of a person required to be covered by a pension plan was the same as that for a blue-collar worker receiving compulsory health insurance. Three years later, both white-collar and blue-collar workers in small offices were included by law. Civil servants received their pensions from mutual benefit associations. Finally, non-employee pensions, as part of the National Insurance, were established in 1959. This entailed compulsory coverage for all those who lived in Japan and

did not have other pension plans. It also provided pensions for people who were self-employed and for workers in small firms with less than five employees per office. This completed the establishment of Japan's universal pension system (Yokoyama and Tada 1991).

To conclude, a poor law was in effect in Japan after 1874, and dependent workers received health insurance in 1922, before they were given suffrage in 1925. On the other hand, independent self-employed persons and land-holding farmers received health insurance in 1938 and pensions in 1959, after they had been given universal suffrage. My hypothesis is, therefore, confirmed. In addition, self-employed individuals must meet a residency requirement to be eligible for health insurance, but workers do not have to meet this requirement.

Family

Next, I compare the historical path of the expansion of political rights with that of social rights in Japan from the standpoint of gender and age. In 1889, any male 25 years of age or older was enfranchised as long as they meet tax requirements. In 1946, after World War II, women were accorded suffrage, and the minimum age was lowered to 20.

Mentally deficient individuals have always been disfranchised, but they were the very people the poor law was designed to protect. This inverse relationship between disfranchisement and the poor law was made explicit at the time that universal suffrage was introduced.

According to the 1874 public relief ordinance, orphans below the age of 13, and elderly persons, the senile, the infirm, and/or the disabled, all of whose family members were over 70 years of age or under 15, were protected. And the Poor Law of 1932 included those who were 65 years of age or older and suffered from senility, as well as children 13 years of

age or younger and pregnant women, if their guardians deserted them. As of 1938, health insurance was established for non-employees who were heads of households and for the members of their families. Health insurance for employees did not provide benefits for family members until 1939. There was no age restriction on beneficiaries.

Compulsory employee pensions were expanded to include female workers in 1944. In 1959, the wives of self-employed men were insured by law and their husbands made contributions on their behalf. By contrast, workers' wives were not automatically covered by any insurance, although they could join the pension plan for non-employees on a voluntary basis. In this sense, the *universal* pension system was universal for males only, just as universal suffrage had been for males only. In 1986, non-employee pensions were extended to cover all members of the working generation (ages 20 to 60) and to provide flat-rate pensions, while employee pensions remained proportional to incomes. As a consequence, all women were accorded pension entitlement (Yokoyama 2002, 36-7, 165-73).

In sum, when women started to vote in 1946, they were already receiving most welfare benefits. Children were also protected, even though they had no voice at the ballot box. Once again, these results are predicted by the theory.

Nation

Finally, I consider aliens' enfranchisement and welfare benefits. Suffrage has never been accorded to aliens. It is true that Koreans in Japan were enfranchised from 1920 to 1945, but that was because they had Japanese nationality resulting from the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 (Matsuda 1995; Mizuno 1996-7). Hence, the case of Korean enfranchisement is not an exception. Koreans now, however, are for the most part considered aliens in Japan, even though their desire for suffrage at present is very strong. One percent of the total population in Japan is alien, of which 51.7 percent is Koreans (Tanaka 1995, 33).

By contrast, welfare benefits are to some degree accorded to aliens (Tanaka 1995, Ch. 6; Tezuka 1999, Ch. 10). Above all, health insurance for employees was applied to aliens from the very beginning, as of 1922. As a result of the Basic Treaty between Japan and Korea, health insurance for non-employees began to be available for permanent resident Koreans in 1965. Refugees followed this group in 1982 thanks to the refugee treaty of that year. Finally, in 1986, all aliens won entitlement if they were able to meet the same residency requirement as Japanese citizens. Interestingly enough, alien employees received health insurance before unemployed aliens, because “employee” was considered a minor category in the classification of aliens. Class effect here is added to that of race.

As for employee pensions, aliens received entitlement in 1946, as the result of a GHQ memorandum. Permanent resident aliens (mainly Koreans) became eligible for non-employee pensions in 1982.

The poor law began to cover aliens in 1946, though nationality requirements were reintroduced in 1950. Since 1954, however, the Ministry of Health has, on several occasions, issued a notice that allows municipalities to apply the poor law to aliens with valid alien ID cards. In 1990, however, the Ministry changed this policy, and now only permanent resident aliens are eligible.

Therefore, even if aliens have never enjoyed political rights, they do enjoy some social rights, as anticipated in the argument of this paper.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Civil society is composed of a hierarchy of citizenship, not equal citizens. This hierarchy has three dimensions of class, family and nation, though these three are unified as indications of economic and political independence. Citizens who belong to the independent majority enjoy political rights earlier in a society's development, while members of dependent minorities win social rights at an earlier time. Disenfranchisement of the poor, and of females and ethnic minorities, was thought to be a natural response of the society before the advent of universal suffrage, just as it still is in regard to transients, the mentally disabled, the young, aliens, and felons. If the former response seems to be unnatural today, perhaps the latter will also be thought of as unnatural in the future.

We know of many reasons why minorities are economically and politically dependent, but we rarely see the reasons for which the majority – the rich, males, and the nation – are independent. It is just assumed that they are *supposed* to be that way, because the other categories are not independent. The majority has power not in and of itself, but as a result of the reflective effect of the minorities' powerlessness. The ways in which society perceives minorities show us how it perceives the majority.

In addition, it goes without saying that all categorical demarcations have limitations. Class, sex, age, and/or ethnicity do not necessarily reflect economic or political independence. And finally, from a normative point of view, it is questionable whether one can justify enfranchisement based on independence and welfare based on the paternalistic care of the dependent. But, we, in human societies, have done just that.

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