Theories of Bad Policy
*Non-representative gevernments and "intended" stagnation
非民主的政府と「意図された」停滞
・Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson(2006) Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective, American Political Science Review, 100, pp. 115-131.
・Acemoglu, D. (2003) Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics, Journal of Comparative Economics, 31, pp. 620-652.
・Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson(2000) Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 90, pp. 126-130.
*Rent-seeking and special interest politics
レント・シーキングと特殊利益政治
・Becker, G.S. (1983). A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, pp. 371-400.
・Grossman, G. M., and E. Helpman (1994) Protection For Sale, American Economic Review 84, pp.833-850.
・Dixit, A., G. M. Grossman, and E. Helpman (1997) Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, pp.752-769.
*Collective action and rational ignorance
集合行為と合理的無知
・Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard University Press).(邦訳あり）
・Downs, A.(1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper).(邦訳あり）
・Wittman, D. (1989). Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, Journal of Political Economy 97, pp.1395-1424.
*Status quo bias and gambling for resurrection
現状維持バイアスと起死回生
・Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991) Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, pp.1146-1155.
・Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991) Why are Stabilizations Delayed? American Economic Review 81, pp.1170-1188.
・Milesi-Ferretti, G.M. (1995) A Simple Model of Disinflation and the Optimality of Doing Nothing, European Economic Review 39, pp.1385-1404.
・Hess, G. D. and A. Orphanides (1995) War Politics: An Economic, Rational Voter Framework, American Economic Review 85, pp.828-846.
*Agency problems and the control of politicians
代理人問題と政治家のコントロール
・Barro, R. (1973) The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14, pp.19-42
・Ferejohn, J. (1986) Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50, pp.5-25
・Rogoff, K. (1990) Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles, American Economic Review 80, pp.21-36.
*Time-inconsistency problems: Commitment vs. flexibility
時間的非整合性問題：コミットメントかフレキシビィリティーか
・ Kydland, F.E. and E.C. Prescott(1977) Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, Journal of Political Economy. 85, pp. 473-492.
・Barro, R. and D. Gordon (1983） Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy, Journal of Monetary Economics 12, pp.101-121.
・Rogoff, K. (1985) The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target, Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, pp.1169-1189.
*Behavioral political economy and rational irrationality
行動政治経済学と合理的非合理性
・Glaeser, E. (2006) Paternalism and Psychology, University of Chicago Law Review 73, pp.133-156.
・Brennan, G. and L. Lomasky (1993) Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference (Cambridge University Press).
・Caplan, B. (2001) Rational Irrationality and the Microfoundations of Political Failure, Public Choice 107, pp.311-331.
*The "unintended" consequences of left-wing policies
左派政策の「意図せざる」結果
・Alesina, A. and G. M. Angeletos (2005) Fairness and Redistribution: US vs. Europe, American Economic Review 95, pp.913-935
・Glaeser, E and A. Shleifer (2003) The Rise of the Regulatory State, Journal of Economic Literature 41, pp.401-425.
・Di Tella, R. and R. MacCulloch (2009) Why Doesn't Capitalism Flow to Poor Countries? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, pp.285-321.
・Rajan, R. and L. Zingales (2003) Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists: Unleashing the Power of Financial Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity (Crown Business).（邦訳あり)
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